An Alternative to even swaps for modeling decision in a multi attribute problem. The case of labor formality by Tetaz, Martin
in the labor market it is not easy to elicit under 
the stated preferences approach, because 
people normally  fail to take into account the 
real tradeoffs implied in the decision; namely 
the price of the benefits in terms of lower wages. 
Besides, people usually underestimate the value 
of such packages, due to the fact that they view 
them more as rights that “should” come with 
any job, than as any other service that can be 
traded at the market.
Since the publication of the Even Swaps 
method (Hammond et. al. 1998), the problem of 
multiple objectives has been treated as step by 
step reduction of alternatives, trading objectives 
in order to reduce the dimensionality of the 
problem rendering clear the tradeoffs implied.
Choice based conjoint analysis (CBCA) 
on the other hand, can be used to obtain 
different shadow prices, without asking people 
to provide any straightforward figure regarding 
their willingness to pay or the importance of 
different objectives.
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Abstract
This paper discusses two different alternatives to deal with the problem of 
multiple objectives in decision making. Even Swaps and Choice Based Conjoint 
are analyzed using an election between hypothetical jobs as a frame of 
decision. We show that not only Choice Based Conjoint Analysis can be used 
to value the different tradeoffs associated, but it can also be used to predict 
people choices even when they are not aware of the trades involved between 
objectives. Finally a tailored pilot survey is used to show the Choice Based 
Method in practice, allowing us to obtain important conclusions regarding 
people willingness to pay for several Labor Formality aspects. 
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Introduction
According to the latest public statistics, 36% 
of the Argentinean labor force works under 
informality conditions; namely: they lack social 
service access  and health insurance, they do 
not save for retirement and they are not under 
formal contracts with their employers.
As a matter of fact, formality is not a 
dichotomy variable. There are different degrees 
of informality, ranging from the low category 
self employed that usually sells different stuff 
at the streets, to the civil service worker that 
has an important share of its wage depending 
on informality agreements.  
Although it is obvious that they would 
rather have better jobs within the formal sector 
of the economy, it is not clear how would they 
decide if they were given the chance to choose 
between different packages of formality.
This problem is characterized in the 
Theory of Decision’s literature (see Bonatti et. 
al. 2011) as a multiple objectives problem. 
Willingness to pay for different benefits 
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It has long been used in environmental 
(Adamowicz et. Al. 1997), transportation 
(Hensher and Bradley 1993) and marketing 
studies (Swait 1993).
To our knowledge, it has never been 
used in labor market studies yet, so the purpose 
of this paper is to take advantage of a tailored 
pilot survey  in order to elicitate the shadow 
prices behind the tradeoffs; namely  how much 
are they willing to sacrifice in order to obtain the 
diverse packages. 
In the next section we will review the 
Even Swaps methodology, then we will describe 
the Choice based Conjoint alternative in the 
following section.  After that we will introduce 
the pilot questionnaire, and some sampling 
issues. Section 5 will describe the data and 
display the main results. Section 6 concludes.
The Even Swaps method
 
To illustrate the method we borrow from the 
authors the following table, known as “Sahid 
Consecuences Table” which, by the way, relies in a 
labor market example, as well.
To  begin with Job E can be regarded as 
“dominated” by Job B, because in every objective 
the later is better than the former, whereas Job 
D is “practically dominated” by Job A, because 
even when the former  has one more day of 
vacations, it pays more and has more benefits.
Therefore the decisions has to be made 
among Jobs A, B and C.
Now, let’s assume we are willing to 
trade off 2 days of vacations for either dental 
benefits, or retirement. Then we can cancel out 
“Benefits”, and the new values for vacations 
would be: Job A, 14 days; Job B, 10 days; Job C 
6 days.
Having done that, let’s suppose we would 
be willing to sacrifice the difference between 
“great enjoyment” and “good enjoyment”, were 
we given $400 more monthly salary. Therefore 
we now cancel the “Enjoyment” objective and 
the new values for monthly salary would be: Job 
A, $2.400; Job B, $2.400; Job C, $ 1800.
We carry on by deciding how much 
do we think is worth the “Flexibility” objective 
in terms of foregone salary. Say “Moderate 
flexibility” is enough for us, so we are willing to 
resign $600 of monthly salary to assure this goal, 
but then we would trade “High” for “Moderate” 
just for $200.
As a result, we can eliminate Flexibility, 
and the new values for monthly salary would be: 
Job A, $2.400; Job B, $1800, and Job C, $2000.
So far we have reduce the dimensionality 
of the problem; from a six objectives one, to a 
three objectives, facilitating the tradeoffs among 
those objectives.
Of course, we can keep reducing 
objectives even to the point of having just only 
one objective remaining, converting therefore 
the problem in a trivial choice.
The authors strongly recommend 
starting with the less important objectives, so as 
to make sure the relevant tradeoffs are the final 
to work with.
As a further recommendation we 
suggest to do the elimination process several 
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 Every subject is shown many alternative 
scenarios of working conditions, and asked to 
produce an election between pairs. Ideally, every 
subject should face every possible alternative 
scenario (number of different attribute values 
powered to the number of attributes), but if 
we can assume that workers are homogeneous 
in regard to their amenities considerations, we 
can replace intra subject’s variability with inter 
subject’s one.
As a result, we obtain a vector 
of differences in attributes between the 
benchmark (job A) and the randomly selected 
alternative mix on the one hand, and a dummy 
variable indicating whether the subject 
preferred the benchmark, on the other.
times in a different order, to guarantee no 
influence of framing or order effects.
Choice based conjoint experiment
 
As useful as the Even Swaps method can be, the 
main disadvantage is that it relies on people being 
able to make the tradeoffs between the different 
objectives.
Behavioral Economics literature has 
shown that this may be a very strong assumption 
(Kahneman 1991). Similar conclusions arise from 
a recent paper in Decision Theory (Bonatti 2007).
An alternative to the Even Swap 
method is the Choice Based cuasi experimental 
approach (see Louviere et. al. 2000). Under 
this methodology, subjects are asked to make 
hypothetical choices between different  multi 
attribute packages, and the shadow prices are 
estimated based upon the real elections, through 
usual econometric techniques
For example, under that technology 
subjects are faced with pairs of mix of different 
attributes of potential jobs. Then they are asked 
to choose between the two sets. The choice 
exercise should looks like the following example:
For example, from the above pair, 
should the choice is to stay with the benchmark, 
the following vector emerges:
 Then, coefficients can be estimate 
either by a logit, a probit or a mixed logit 
specification (depending on the assumptions in 
regard to the errors distribution of the random 
utility model theoretically implied).
Finally, by dividing every coefficient 
by the corresponding of “Δ wage” we obtain 
the marginal willingness to pay for a discrete 
change in each job attribute; it’s shadow price.
 
 
The pilot questionnaire 
 
So, in order to estimate the willingness to 
pay for different formality packages, we run a 
choice based conjoint analysis (see Louviere 
1994; 1998) taking advantage of a tailored pilot 
survey conducted by CEDLAS, from The National 
University of La Plata.
The instrument of information 
recollection was divided in two main sections.
  The first section contains 39 usual 
socioeconomic questions, covering personal 
characteristics, household composition, and 
educational background, working conditions and 
status, etcetera. (See appendix A).
  The second section contains 42 
alternative combinations of different working 
scenarios.
  We randomly sampled 6 different 
neighborhoods of La Plata city; the Capital of 
Buenos Aires, Argentina. (See appendix B).
  During the second weekend of February 
2012, we run the pilot survey obtaining responses 
form 102 subjects.
Data and Results
   
Since we surveyed 102 subjects and administered 
42 different sets of scenarios, we arrived at 4284 
number of potential observations, and 3318 
real choices made.
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The next table displays the main statistics 
 With these marginal effects
From our data, we obtain the following probit estimate
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Dividing the coefficients as explained above, 
yields the following shadow prices
   The results seem to indicate that no 
particular aspect of jobs formality is preferred 
by the public. At the same time, the shadow 
prices look pretty high, moreover if we consider 
that the average wage in Argentina is $4.969 per 
month and the minimum wage is $2.300. It is 
even high if we consider that the average wage 
for private formal workers at the city of Buenos 
Aires (best wages in Argentina) is $ 6.900.
  If we relax the assumption that there 
is not heterogeneity across subjects, we can 
replicate the same analysis for different groups 
of particular interest.
 
Sorted by formality (full formality)
  Sorted by sex
 Sorted by status within the household
  Although the sample size of this pilot 
study is not big enough to guarantee definite 
conclusions, there seems to be differences in 
the willingness to pay for alternative benefits 
associated to formality in the labor market.
  Formal workers have a higher 
consideration for Pension plans and labor 
stability, whereas informal ones put more 
weight on social security access. 
  Females have, by far, bigger shadow 
prices than men.
  Non household heads give less relative 
importance to labor stability.
  Finally, poorer quintiles in the wage 
distribution have smaller or non significant 
willingness to pay for formality.
  All group differences in the willingness 
to pay for formality, seems to be quite intuitive.
  Informal workers suffer the lack of 
social security access every day, but probably 
discount hyperbolically the expected drawback 
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Sorted by wage quintiles
of being fired or not having access to pensions 
in the future.
  Females have less consideration for 
money, but value heavily the different formality 
characteristics of a job, because they are more 
risk averse.
  Not being in charge of the family 
obviously implies less economic responsibility 
at home, therefore the value given to labor 
stability decreases. 
  Last but not least, the reasons why 
poorer quintiles value formality to a lesser 
extent than richer ones are not straightforward 
and deserve further research. Perhaps there is 
some kind of habituation or adaptation effect 
taking place, whereby low income workers are 
somewhat used to low quality jobs. Probably 
the low incomes of these workers coupled 
with their free access to public hospitals may 
explain why they give more importance to 
money wages.
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Conclusions
Decision makers have struggled for years once 
facing the problem of modeling choices in 
multiple objective scenarios.
  Even Swaps between objectives was 
used as a solution because by cancelling some 
objectives allowed the decision maker to realize 
the relevant tradeoffs involved in the decision.
  In this paper we showed that Choice 
Based Conjoint Analysis can be used instead.
This technique allows the elicitation of 
shadow prices that reflect the all the tradeoffs 
involved, without requiring to reduce the 
dimensionality of the problem. 
  There is also no need to even being 
conscious of the tradeoffs involved.
  Once the shadow prices are estimated 
any multiple objective alternatives can be given 
a monetary value, rendering the decision trivial.
  To our knowledge no previous research 
has used choice based conjoint techniques to 
elicit willingness to pay for different aspects of 
formal jobs. 
  Neither has any prior investigation 
compared this methodology with the Even 
Swaps technique.
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Apendix B
Le voy a mostrar algunos trabajos hipotéticos  y le voy a pedir que elija en cual le gustaría más 
trabajar si se los ofrecieran.
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